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The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed
Formula That Fosters the Policies of Securities
Regulation
Cheryl L. Wade*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act" or "the Act")' generally
requires the filing of a registration statement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") prior to the offer or sale2 of any
security 3 and prohibits the sale of any security prior to the effective
date of the registration statement.4 For the prospective issuer of secu-
rities, the preparation and filing of this registration statement can be
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1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1988).
2. Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act defines "sale" and "offer" broadly. A "sale" includes
"every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security for value." 15
U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1988). An "offer" includes "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." Id. See
generally Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 247-52 (2d ed. 1988).
3. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act defines "security" to include common financial
instruments such as notes, stock, bonds, debentures, and other less obvious instruments
such as investment contracts and voting-trust certificates. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
The statute's broad definition of "security" has led courts to find the sale of securities in
transactions involving the sale of portions of an orange grove, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1946); multi-level distributorships, SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th Cir. 1974); and beavers, Continental
Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 471 (10th Cir. 1967). See generally 3 HAROLD
S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §§ 2.02-.24 (Release No.
44, 1993).
4. 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988). A registration statement must include
information necessary to enable a reasonable investor to make an informed investment
decision. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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costly and time-consuming. To prevent the hampering of commerce
that results from unnecessary registration, the 1933 Act provides a
variety of exemptions from registration that relieve issuers of the cost
and delay of registration. These exemptions generally reflect a balanc-
ing of the 1933 Act's goal of protecting investors through mandatory
registration with its goal of facilitating capital formation, particularly
for small issuers. Under certain circumstances, separate offerings,
each of which would satisfy the requirements of an exemption if
considered separately, may be combined under the SEC's "integration"
theory. The combination of two or more offerings often results in a
single, integrated offering that does not qualify for an exemption when
considered as a whole. When the integrated offering fails to satisfy the
requirements of any of the 1933 Act's exemptions from registration,
the issuer faces serious consequences for offering unregistered securi-
ties in violation of section 5 of the Act. An unregistered offering can
result in an injunctive action by the SEC and in civil actions by
purchasers of the unregistered securities.6
To determine whether separate offerings are to be integrated, the
SEC has developed a test for integration that consists of five factors.
Offerings will be integrated when: (1) the offerings are part of the
same plan of financing; (2) the offerings are made for the same general
purpose; (3) the same class of security is issued in each of the offer-
ings; (4) the offerings are made at or about the same time; and (5) the
same kind of consideration is to be received in each of the offerings.
This test for integration poses two problems. First, because the test
lacks clarity,8 it is frequently impossible to predict whether an issuer's
offerings will be integrated. When structuring transactions, a
prospective issuer may bear considerable expense and delay in obtain-
5. See Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465,
469 (1979). An issuer attempting to raise money by offering securities to the public
must spend considerable amounts of time and money to register the securities with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"). See id. at 469 n.17; Daniel J.
Morrissey, Integration of Securities Offerings-The ABA's "Indiscreet" Proposal 26
ARIz. L. REV. 41, 42 n.9 (1984). Merely compiling the necessary data to draft the regis-
tration statement takes a great deal of time, and after submitting preliminary drafts of the
registration statement to the SEC, the issuer must wait for comments from the SEC staff
and modify the registration statement to address the SEC's concerns. Morrissey, supra,
at 42 n.9. A substantial sum of money is also spent on fees for professionals such as
attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers, and potentially enormous printing
costs can increase the cost of registering securities considerably. See id.
6. Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act grants investors the right of rescission for section 5
violations by issuers. 15 U.S.C. § 771.
7. Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 9191 2770, 2781 (1962).
8. See infra part IV.A. 1.
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ing legal advice to determine whether the enumerated factors apply to
its offerings, thereby causing integration and, perhaps, requiring regis-
tration. Issuers' counsel, however, are typically unable to provide any
assurance that the offerings will be protected from a later finding of
integration. Because of the formula's uncertainty, offerings may be
precluded or delayed, and some possibly exempt offerings may be
unnecessarily registered. Second, the test's five factors reflect neither
the fundamental theory of the integration doctrine nor the goals and
policies of the 1933 Act.
In this Article I will propose a test that enhances certainty while
achieving the legitimate goals served by integration. In part II, I exam-
ine the goal of investor protection that registration was designed to
provide as well as the competing goal of facilitating capital formation
by relieving issuers of the burden of registration in certain instances.
In part III, I describe and critique each of the five factors of the SEC's
current test for integration. In part IV, I analyze the problems created
by the SEC's integration analysis, and I also consider another
approach to integration proposed by the Task Force on Integration (the
"Task Force"), a review group established by the American Bar
Association's Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities. I con-
clude that although the Task Force's proposal, standing alone, is
inadequate, the safe harbors enumerated in the proposal should be
adopted to provide more objective certainty to the threshold examina-
tion of the integration question. In part V, I discuss the many contexts
in which the Task Force's safe harbors will be unavailable for multiple
securities offerings. In those instances, I propose that integration
should not be automatic. Rather, integration should occur only when
the issuer is unable to demonstrate a rational business purpose for
making separate offerings. Such a test would focus more
appropriately on the issuer's reasons for the particular structure of the
offering.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Policy Considerations Under the Securities Act of 1933
Congress enacted the 1933 Act in response to the practices of some
companies that raised funds by offering and selling their securities to
the public without revealing sufficient information concerning the
enterprise and the securities offered. 9 Initially, the Act's primary pur-
9. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Symposium: Current Issues in
Securities Regulation, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329,
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pose and prevailing goal was to insure that investors were protected by
enabling them to make informed investment decisions. I° The Act
sought to accomplish this by requiring issuers to make "full and fair
disclosure of the character of [the] securities" that they offered and
sold to the public."' Indeed, the concept of disclosure is the pervading
philosophy of the entire body of securities laws. 2
The extent to which information available to offerees of registered
securities actually assists them in making informed investment deci-
sions is unclear. 3 First, because the SEC precludes the inclusion in
disclosure documents of favorable information that cannot be verified,
the 1933 Act's disclosure policies have caused an "unduly pessimistic"
tone in registration materials.' 4 This pessimistic tone can distort the
disclosed information 5 and dissuade investors from evaluating and
taking advantage of potentially valuable opportunities.' 6 Further
complicating the analysis of information contained in registration
statements is the inability of investors to verify the truthfulness of all
statements presented in the registration statement.17
334-35 (1988). At the beginning of this century, the new enterprises-transportation
companies, radio companies and manufacturers of new products and equipment-raised
money by offering and selling their securities to eager groups of investors. Id. These
optimistic investors, anxious to make a great deal of money as quickly as possible, pur-
chased the securities issued by these new companies after having received only superfi-
cial and incomplete descriptions of the securities, the issuers' businesses, and the
manner in which the capital raised by the offerings would be used. Id. Many investors
were defrauded by sellers of completely worthless securities. One unscrupulous
businessman boasted of his ability to raise funds by defrauding investors in his book,
entitled My Adventures with Your Money, which he dedicated "'[t]o the American
Damphool Speculator, surnamed the American Sucker, otherwise described herein as The
Thinker, Who Thinks He Knows But He Doesn't-Greetings!"' Id. (quoting Laylin K.
James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV. 624, 627 (1934)).
10. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, pmbl., 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
1 1. Id. Because the 1933 Act primarily protects investors against insufficient disclo-
sure, it has been referred to as the "rotten egg statute"; that is, one can sell all the rotten
eggs one wants if one discloses that the eggs are rotten. A Panel Discussion, New
Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus. LAw. 505 (1973)
[hereinafter "Panel Discussion"]. If the investor purchases the "rotten eggs" on an
informed basis, the Act provides no relief.
Although the Act's principal focus pertains to disclosure, the Act also contains an
anti-fraud provision that prohibits the offer or sale of any security through fraud or
misrepresentation while using the facilities of interstate commerce or the mails. See
1933 Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988).
12. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 11, at 505.
13. See, e.g., Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities
Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 338-39 (1974).
14. Id.
15. See Panel Discussion, supra note 11, at 526-27.
16. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 338-39.
17. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Integration of Securities Offerings
Moreover, much of the language used in the disclosure materials of
different issuers regarding different offerings is uniform. This
uniformity diminishes the value of information provided through regis-
tration to the offeree for the purpose of analyzing and comparing
investment opportunities. 8 Finally, the financial information dis-
closed through registration may be so complex that it is beyond the
understanding of unsophisticated investors and is therefore of no prac-
tical use to them.' 9 Some commentators assert that most average
investors ignore the vast amounts of data disclosed in registration
materials.20 Even if offerees do not use the disclosed data, however,
the disclosure requirement and an issuer's potential liability for false
and misleading statements made in disclosure documents protect
investors by deterring issuers from engaging in practices that may
potentially harm offerees.2
The 1933 Act's disclosure requirement also serves a secondary
interest of promoting greater efficiency in securities markets by
guaranteeing the availability of investment information needed by
securities analysts.22 Mandatory disclosure essentially subsidizes the
cost of gathering the most accurate information, enabling securities
analysts to evaluate investment opportunities in a more efficient
manner and ultimately making the securities market more efficient. 3
Because investment information is collected in one source, analysts do
not waste economic resources pursuing investment information as they
attempt to gain a trading advantage.2 4
Moreover, mandatory disclosure reduces the amount of information
gathering that must be done by individual investors. Even if one
assumes that many investors who attempt to rely upon information
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 674 (1984). Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel noted that "low quality sellers can mimic the disclosure of ascertain-
able facts while making bogus statements about things buyers cannot verify." Id. As a
result, the low quality sellers erode the value of the information in registration state-
ments, preventing purchasers from distinguishing between high and low quality
securities. Id.
18. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 312; Panel Discussion, supra note 11, at 526.
19. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 312.
20. See Thomas A. Halleran & John N. Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on
Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 96 (1959).
2 1. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of The Market
for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & EcON. 613, 668 (1981).
22. Anderson, supra note 13, at 314i see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and
the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984).
23. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 722.
24. See id.
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obtained through disclosure remain "uninformed, ''21 mandatory disclo-
sure creates efficiencies that theoretically benefit these uninformed
investors. Uninformed investors may purchase securities confident
that their price reflects the true value of the securities based upon the
market's response to the actions of informed investors.26 Some
commentators believe that mandatory disclosure benefits the economy
as a whole, since many active investors are confident that the disclo-
sure system provides equal access to investment information.2 7
Although mandatory disclosure offers some benefits, it may also carry
significant costs, such as large expenditures of time and money to
comply with registration. Consequently, issuers, particularly small
businesses, may be forced to forego potentially beneficial opportuni-
ties because the expense and delay of the disclosure system render
capital markets inaccessible.28
In order to accomplish the goal of "full and fair disclosure, 29
section 5 of the 1933 Act requires issuers to register their securities
offerings with the SEC before their securities are offered and sold to
the public.3° Prospective issuers must disclose relevant information
concerning the securities offering in a registration statement and
prospectus and must file these documents with the SEC before deliver-
ing the prospectus to potential investors.31 It might take three to six
25. See supra text accompanying note 20.
26. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 694 ("The uninformed trader can take
a free ride on the information impounded by the market: they get the same price received
by the professional traders without having to do any of the work of learning
information.").
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel question, however, whether the regulation of
securities offerings has in fact increased market efficiency or protected investors by
decreasing fraudulent activity by issuers. See id. at 693, 696; but see Jarrell, supra note
21, at 641, 666 (concluding that securities offered prior to passage of the 1933 Act were
not overpriced, though not rejecting the idea that the mandatory disclosure system
enhances market efficiency).
27. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 685; see also Jarrell, supra note 21,
at 668 (suggesting that the high cost of registration reduces the risk to investors inher-
ent in new issues by decreasing the volume of new issues).
28. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 708.
29. The preamble to the 1933 Act specifically compels "full and fair disclosure." See
supra text accompanying note 11.
30. See 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
31. Section 7 of the Act requires issuers to disclose all information and file all
documents specified in Schedule A of the Act. 1933 Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1988).
Much of the data relates to the offering and to the issuer's business, management, and
assets. For instance, issuers must describe or list the general character of the business,
the identification of directors and officers and their remuneration, the purpose or
purposes of the issue, the manner in which the price to be paid for the securities was
determined, the way in which the proceeds from the offering will be used, the arrange-
ments and costs of the underwriting, the plan of distribution, and a description of the
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months for a company to prepare and file registration materials with
the SEC before the company may raise capital by offering its securities
to the public.32 Additionally, issuers sometimes spend hundreds of
thousands of dollars in legal, filing, and accounting fees and printing
expenses for registration statements.33
In addition to requiring large expenditures of time and funds,
mandatory disclosure can also be costly in terms of lost opportunities.
It is possible that companies, especially small businesses, may be
forced to forego potentially beneficial ventures because the expense
and delay of the disclosure system renders capital markets
inaccessible. Recognizing that the benefits of disclosure may, in
certain instances, be outweighed by the burden that registration places
on an issuer's ability to raise capital, the 1933 Act provides several
exemptions from registration. Issuers do not have to register their
securities being registered. See generally 1933 Act Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
(1988); 2 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 599-601 (3d ed. 1989).
Financial conditions such as material contracts, capital structure, and recent history
must also be fully described, and information relating to the issuer's parents, affiliates,
and subsidiaries must be disclosed. 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra, at 600.
3 2. Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences,
27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1981). After the materials are initially prepared and filed with
the SEC, they are often revised several times to conform with comments made by SEC
staff, incurring additional attorney's fees and further delaying the commencement of the
offering. 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 517-32 (3d ed. 1989).
33. Schneider et al., supra note 32, at 29-33. Judge Easterbrook and Professor
Fischel suggest that one of the reasons the disclosure system remains in place is that
professionals in the area of securities regulation make a great deal of money and there-
fore "have every incentive to support the status quo on an interest-group basis."
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 671-72.
34. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 708.
35. The 1933 Act provides exemptions from registration for certain securities
pursuant to § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1988), and for certain transactions pursuant to § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 77d (1988). Under the Act, the nature of either the specific securities or the
particular transaction justifies excusing the prospective issuer from registering its secu-
rities offering. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d. The differences between "exempt securities"
and "exempt transactions," however, are often obscure and indistinct, and the reasons
for listing an exemption as an exempt security rather than an exempt transaction
frequently seem illogical and untenable. See 3 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1142-44 (3d ed. 1989) (arguing that securities exempt pursuant to §§
3(a)(9)-(11), 3(b), and 3(c) of the Act are actually exempt transactions).
The Act provides, for example, the following exemptions: § 3(a)(9) (securities
exchanged by a single issuer with its security holders); § 3(a)(10) (judicially or adminis-
tratively approved exchanges); § 3(a)(l 1) (intrastate offerings); § 3(b) and Regulation A
(providing a simplified form of registration for smaller offerings); § 3(c) and Regulation
E (offerings by small business investment companies); § 4(2) and Regulation D (private
offerings); § 4(6) (offers or sales to accredited investors); Regulation B (various types of
offerings of fractional undivided interests in oil or gas rights up to $250,000 per year);
and Regulation F (assessments on assessable stock of any corporation with its principle
place of business in any state or territory of the United States). See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN,
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securities offerings when they can satisfy all of the requirements under
an exemption, thereby avoiding the delay and expense of the registra-
tion process that impedes their ability to raise capital.
These exemptions from registration embody the policy of the 1933
Act to facilitate commerce, a goal that competes with the policy of dis-
closure and investor protection through disclosure.36 The facilitation
of commerce has emerged as a goal equally important to that of
investor protection under the Act. More specifically, facilitating the
small issuers' ability to raise capital has always been and continues to
be an important focus in securities regulation. In July 1992, the SEC
adopted a series of significant rule revisions known as the "Small
Business Initiatives," designed to facilitate the raising of capital by
small businesses and to reduce the burdens placed on these companies
by the federal securities laws. 37 The initiatives are intended to "facili-
tate the access of small business issuers to the public markets '38 and to
"simplify the small business disclosure requirements" under the Act.39
Recent amendments to Rule 144A similarly reflect the importance that
the SEC places on the facilitation of commerce. Rule 144A essentially
provides a safe harbor from registration for the resale of certain securi-
ties to "qualified institutional buyers. 4 0 The amendments to Rule
supra, at 1142-1473 for a thorough analysis of these and other exemptions provided by
the 1933 Act.
36. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 334 (3d Cir. 1984) (commenting
that in enacting the 1933 Act, which provides exemptions for certain transactions,
"Congress acted with a number of rationales in mind, among them the facilitation of
commerce in certain named instruments to reduce transaction costs and enhance the free
flow of capital"); Manuel F. Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of
Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 148-49 (1959) ("The [exemptions in the 1933
Act] reflect a Congressional determination to temper the full effect of the statute as
against offerings by small business concerns and certain companies organized to
provide capital to such concerns."); see generally Raymond M. Jacobson, Exemptions
in Securities Act Registration, 33 FLA. B.J. 69 (1959).
37. Small Business Initiatives, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (1992) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. and containing Securities Act Release No. 6924,
Exchange Act Release No. 30,968, and Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2287).
To facilitate the raising of capital and reduce the burden of compliance with the securi-
ties laws, the SEC revised Regulation A and Rule 504. Regulation A as revised allows
eligible companies to "test the waters" by soliciting indications from the public as to
the public's interest in the company and its business prior to the costly preparation of a
Regulation A offering document. SEC Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1993).
Similarly, Rule 504 has been revised to permit less restrictive use of the one million
dollar exemption. SEC Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1993).
38. Additional Small Business Initiatives, 58 Fed. Reg. 26,509, 26,510 (1993)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.).
39. Ralph S. Janvey, The SEC's Small Business Initiatives: Regulatory Reform or
Shabby Conduct?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 4 (1993).
40. SEC Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1993).
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144A reflect the SEC's goal of facilitating commerce by expanding the
category of institutional investors eligible to buy unregistered securities
in a private placement.4' The expansion of the application of this
exemption facilitates the raising of capital for small issuers by reducing
their costs of financing.42
In pursuing the goal of facilitating commerce, the SEC has not,
however, abandoned its goal of investor protection. The SEC has
promulgated and interpreted rules on exemptions to provide more
substantive protection for offerees and purchasers of unregistered
securities than was contemplated under the exemptions originally
enacted by Congress in the Act.43 For example, issuers relying upon
the private placement exemption of Regulation D44 can only offer their
securities to a limited number of potential investors who are deemed to
have investment sophistication and access to information concerning
the issuer and its offering. 45 Due to their business acumen and access
to information, the offerees of a private placement are deemed not to
need the protection that registration affords.' Offerees of a securities
transaction that is exempt pursuant to Regulation D nevertheless
receive a private placement memorandum disclosing information per-
taining to the issuer and its offering.47 Since less information is
required in the private placement memorandum than in the documents
of a registered offering, preparation of the private placement offering
materials saves time and money for issuers relying on this exemp-
tion.48 The private placement offerees are, however, substantively
protected by the disclosure contained in the private placement
memorandum and by their access to information about the offering and
the issuer.49
41. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,721 (1992)
(containing Securities Act Release No. 6963).
42. Id.
43. See A.B.A. Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Integration of
Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41 Bus. LAW. 595, 641
(1986) [hereinafter Task Force on Integration].
44. SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1993).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See SEC Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1993); SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. §
230.506 (1993).
48. A private placement memorandum, however, still contains a significant amount
of data. See SEC Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1993) (setting forth the information
that must be provided in a private placement memorandum).
49. Under SEC Rule 502, the issuer must give purchasers of securities offered under
Rule 505 or 506 "the opportunity to ask questions and receive answers concerning the
terms and conditions of the offering." SEC Rule 502(b)(2)(v), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502
(1993).
1994]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
The exemptions from registration reflect a willingness, in certain
instances, to assist issuers in capital formation at a tolerable cost to
investors.5 ° When an issuer satisfies the requirements under any one
of the 1933 Act's exemptions, the benefits of disclosure through the
registration process give way to the Act's countervailing policy of
facilitating capital formation. When exemption requirements are met,
issuers are assisted in raising funds even though there is a cost to
investors-the lack of the information that registration provides. An
issuer may only forego the costs of registration if its offering satisfies
all the requirements of an exemption. The 1933 Act has carefully
drawn the boundaries of the exemptions.51 If an issuer falls within
these boundaries, the goal of facilitating commerce appropriately takes
precedence because either the particular exemption provides substan-
tive protection to the investors or the investors simply do not need the
protection provided by registration. In contrast, if issuers proceed
beyond these boundaries and splinter a single nonexempt offering into
two or more exempt offerings, the disclosure system would essentially
be eviscerated by an attempt to sell unregistered securities for which no
exemption is available. When an issuer goes beyond the boundaries
drawn under the exemptions, the goal of information dissemination
through disclosure overcomes the goal of facilitating commerce. To
prevent sales of securities in the latter circumstance, the SEC devel-
oped the doctrine of integration.
B. The Role of Integration
Although the SEC recognizes that less disclosure is sometimes
necessary to facilitate commerce and capital formation,52 it has been
unwilling to do away with the disclosure system altogether. One
manifestation of the SEC's continued adherence to the principle of
investor protection through disclosure is the integration doctrine. In
conceiving the integration principle, the SEC recognized that while it is
sometimes necessary to assist capital formation by providing
registration exemptions, the benefits of disclosure should not be
sacrificed unless an issuer satisfies all requirements of a particular
exemption. Inherent in the integration principle is the concept that
although issuers should be assisted in raising capital, investor
protection should be sacrificed only in the limited circumstances
specified in each exemption. The SEC devised the integration
50. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 474.
5 1. See Morrissey, supra note 5, at 54.
52. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
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principle to avoid abuse of the exemptions from registration.
The SEC developed the concept of integration shortly after the
passage of the 1933 Act5 3 to prevent issuers from circumventing the
Act's registration requirements."4 To evade the Act's registration
requirements and the accompanying expense and delay where there is
no legitimately available exemption, many issuers divide what is
essentially one offering, for which no exemption is available, into two
or more separate offerings that each satisfy exemption requirements.55
Because the boundaries of the Act's exemptions have been carefully
drawn, the division of single offerings for the sole purpose of avoid-
ing registration frustrates the Act's registration requirement and the
Act's goal of investor protection through "full and fair disclosure."
The integration principle attempts to prevent this misuse of the Act's
exemptions by combining offerings that have been purposefully sepa-
rated into a single, integrated offering for which there may be no
exemption from registration.56 Offerings are integrated and
registration is required when issuers have abused the Act's
exemptions.
To determine whether an issuer has artificially divided an offering to
evade the 1933 Act's registration requirements, the SEC examines
multiple, apparently exempt offerings to determine whether those
offerings actually constitute a single, larger offering.57 If the SEC
53. See Securities Act Release No. 97, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1027 (Dec. 28,
1933) (declaring that the intrastate offering exemption pursuant to § 3(a)(l 1) would not
be available to an issuer planning both an intrastate offering and a registered interstate
offering because the two offerings would actually constitute a single issue, and the inter-
state sales would taint the intrastate offering); see also Deaktor, supra note 5, at 492.
54. See generally Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 595; Deaktor, supra
note 5, at 492.
55. See Kathryn Taylor Frame, Note, Securities Regulation: Integration of Securities
Offerings, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 864, 866 (1981).
56. See Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 595, 641; Morrissey, supra note
5, at 43-44. When transactions are integrated into a single offering that does not qualify
for an exemption, there are two possible consequences. First, the purchasers of the secu-
rities may bring an action to rescind their purchases. Second, the SEC may bring suit to
enjoin an issuer's continued offer and sale of securities in reliance upon exemptions that
are no longer available as a result of the integration of the offerings. See supra note 6
and accompanying text; Morrissey, supra note 5, at 43-44; Deaktor, supra note 5, at
470-71.
57. See Morrissey, supra note 5, at 54. Note, however, that an exempt offering may
be integrated with either another exempt offering or a nonexempt offering, Task Force
on Integration, supra note 43, at 595, if those offerings are not separated by at least six
months of time. See infra note 61 discussing the SEC's temporal safe harbor from inte-
gration. Indeed, integration may ensue from innumerable combinations of offerings.
For example, depending upon the particular circumstances, an apparently exempt private
placement offering pursuant to SEC Rule 506 may be integrated with either a separate,
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concludes that the offerings should be integrated, either the combined
offering, considered as a whole, must independently satisfy the
requirements of an exemption, or the issuer must register the offering.
The concept of integration retains the benefits of disclosure 58 by pre-
cluding issuers from exceeding the boundaries of the Act's exemptions
"by resorting to a combination of transactional exemptions to insulate
what would otherwise be a nonexempt public offering from the Act's
registration provisions. 59
Even a faultless issuer, however, must be aware of the "pitfalls" that
the SEC's integration doctrine presents. 60 When planning a transac-
tion, a prospective issuer of an apparently exempt offering must care-
fully examine previous and possible subsequent offerings to determine
whether any combination of the offerings might later be integrated.
Unless the proposed offerings qualify under one of the limited safe
harbors from integration, 61 the issuer must decipher the SEC's five
factor test to determine whether offerings should be integrated.62 Such
determinations have proven immensely difficult for both prospective
issuers and the SEC itself.63 A close examination of each of the five
factors contained in Release No. 4552 will illustrate the problems of
the SEC's integration policy.
apparently exempt intrastate offering pursuant to § 3(a)(l 1) or a separate registered
offering. See, e.g., 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 1212.
5 8. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12, 22-27 and accompanying text.
59. Deaktor, supra note 5, at 492.
60. See id. at 472.
6 1. The SEC provides several safe harbors from integration. These include provi-
sions that prevent the integration of offerings pursuant to Regulation D, SEC Rule 502,
17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1993); Regulation A, Rule 251, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (1993);
and, intrastate offerings pursuant to SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1993). For
example, SEC Rule 502 provides a temporal safe harbor for certain offerings separated
by at least six months. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1993). For a thorough analysis of the
SEC's safe harbors from integration, see 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 1221-28.
Even though these safe harbor provisions assist some prospective issuers, the provi-
sions do not resolve many of the questions pertaining to the SEC's integration policy
and specifically to its five factor test. Moreover, these safe harbor provisions do not
cover the transactions of small issuers that legitimately separate offerings because they
must raise capital frequently and consequently are unable to separate their offerings by at
least six-month periods in compliance with any of the safe harbor provisions.
When structuring transactions, the unavailability of a safe harbor from registration
might cause an issuer to conclude that offerings must be registered if no other exemption
from registration is clearly available. Consequently, the issuer might incur delay and
additional expense at a time when it is least able to afford to do so.
62. See supra text accompanying note 7.
63. See infra part IV.A.l.
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III. DISCUSSION: A FACTOR-BY-FACTOR ANALYSIS
OF THE SEC'S TEST FOR INTEGRATION
A. The Single Plan of Financing Factor
One of the components of the SEC's formula for integration
involves determining whether separate offerings constitute a single
plan of financing.' The SEC staff and the courts have frequently cited
the single plan of financing factor in deciding whether multiple securi-
ties offerings should be integrated.65 In fact, a single plan of financing
was found in every case where integration was mandated.66 The
importance of this observation, however, is limited by the fact that a
single plan of financing arguably existed in many of the cases where
the SEC staff did not recommend that the offerings be integrated.67
The frequency with which the SEC staff and the courts cite this factor
seems to indicate that they attach some significance to it. The nebulous
interpretation of this factor, however, causes much confusion and
uncertainty for issuers attempting to raise capital and leaves too much
room for manipulation by issuers intending to evade the Act's
registration requirements.68
Although the SEC has not developed a precise method of determin-
ing when two or more securities offerings constitute a single plan of
financing, some of the cases and SEC no-action letters generally
suggest that there are three components to be considered: (1) the
method by which an issuer offers securities; (2) the timing of the offer-
ings; and (3) whether the offerings are financially interdependent.69
Some issuers' counsel have proposed that offerings made under
different methods of distribution involve different plans of financing.7 °
When offerings are made to different groups, for example, one offer-
ing made to the public and another offering to employees, the SEC
might determine that the offerings are not part of a single plan because
64. See Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 2770, 2781 (1962).
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1980); Walker v.
Montclaire Housing Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358, 1364-65 (M.D.N.C. 1990); Tele-
Tower, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,540, at 80,188 (Jan. 25, 1978).
66. Frame, supra note 55, at 870-71.
67. See Canon Club Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 12826 (May 25, 1978);
Shockey Cos., SEC No-Action Letter [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,924, at 87,437 (Nov. 12, 1976).
68. Deaktor, supra note 5, at 541.
69. See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 1214.
70. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 530.
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they involve different methods of offering the securities. 7  As to
whether offerings are financially interdependent, one letter of inquiry
to the SEC asserted that because "the success or failure of the
exchange will be independent of the success or failure of the [other]
offering" no single plan of financing existed.7 2 In its reply, the SEC
staff, without discussing the merits of the assertion contained in the
letter of inquiry, recommended that no action to integrate be taken.73
Some confusion stems from the SEC's and the courts' failure to
define precisely and apply consistently the three suggested components
of the single plan of financing factor. Neither the cases nor the no-
action letters provides a clear definition or description of "financially
interdependent" offerings or offerings "coordinated with each other as
to timing." In addition to the fact that it is unclear when or how one
should use these suggested components to test for a single plan of
financing, they are easily manipulated. Issuers can vary the methods
of distributing the securities in slight ways in order to avoid a finding
that offerings involve a single plan of financing.74
Not only have several courts construed these components differ-
ently, some completely ignore these three components in determining
whether there is a single plan of financing. One court in particular
found that several offerings were not part of a single plan of financing
because at the time of the first offering the issuer did not intend to
make the subsequent offerings.75 Courts defining the single plan
factor in this way allow issuers to make additional offerings to raise
funds for unanticipated needs. This approach to the single plan factor
requires a subjective examination of the expectations of the issuer's
management. Such an analysis of the issuer's intentions could be
easily manipulated, since an issuer's management could avoid integra-
7 1. See, e.g., Pacific Physician Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55629
(July 22, 1985).
72. UST Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 14485, at *4 (Apr. 8, 1977).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 10903, at *4
(July 13, 1977) (concluding that "the methods of offering the two types of securities are
sufficiently different to constitute separate plans of financing").
75. See Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D. Mass. 1974)
(holding that although six offerings were made for the same general purpose, because the
issuer had hoped that the first financing would be sufficient and expected each successive
financing to be the last, the offerings did not involve a single plan of financing and "the
integrated offering doctrine is clearly inapplicable"); see also Barrett v. Triangle
Mining Corp., No. 72 Civ. 5111, 1976 WL 760, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1976) (holding
that integration was not mandated where "unforeseen operating difficulties" required the
issuer to raise additional funds); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609,
624-25 (D. Del. 1971) (concluding that numerous offerings issued over a three year
period to acquire ten "unique" businesses did not require integration).
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tion by stating that it did not intend to make subsequent offerings.76
This approach may also, in effect, punish well-managed issuers that
can foresee their capital requirements and that plan at one time to make
several legitimately separated offerings-that is, offerings that are not
separated in order to evade the Act's registration requirements.77
Another confusing approach that the SEC staff and the courts have
taken uses other factors of the five factor test to define the single plan
of financing factor. Specifically, the cases and no-action letters
commonly fail to distinguish between the single plan of financing and
the same general purpose factors. Very often the discussion of these
two factors is not analytically distinct.78 Several cases and no-action
letters have suggested that offerings are not part of a single plan of
financing when offerings are made for different purposes. 79 In
another instance, the SEC staff indicated that integration might be war-
ranted because the offerings were made at or about the same time and
for the same purpose, and therefore involved a single plan of financ-
ing.s0 This failure to distinguish the single plan of financing factor
analysis from that required by the remaining factors essentially renders
it useless in the integration analysis.
Despite the frequency of its citation, the single plan of financing
76. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 531.
77. Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Integration and Private Placements, 19 REV. SEC. &
COM. REG. 49, 51 (1986).
78. See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 1215; see also Deaktor, supra note 5, at
530-31 (noting that factors are often defined by other factors).
79. See, e.g., Pacific Physician Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55629
(July 22, 1985). In Pacific Physician Services, the SEC determined that offerings to two
distinct groups, the public and numerous employees, were "not intended for the same
purpose and [were] not part of a single plan of financing." Id. at *3.
Similarly, where offerings possess the same general purpose, the offerings most
likely possess a single plan of financing. See, e.g., Charles E. Watters, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1978 WL 13303 (Apr. 24, 1978). In Watters, Charles Watters sought to acquire
oil and gas leases from landowners by giving them royalty interests. Id. at *1. He then
would offer prospective investors fractional undivided interests in the rights obtained
under the leases. Id. The SEC found that his scheme constituted "a single plan of financ-
ing, the general purpose of which would be to develop the oil and gas leasehold interest
acquired by Mr. Watters." Id. at *4.
80. LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 78,136 at 76,614 (Aug. 15, 1985). In LaserFax, the issuer planned three
offerings: a private offering; a debenture offering; and a public offering of common
stock. Id. The SEC staff declined to take a no-action position noting in particular that:
(1) the debentures were convertible into common stock; (2) the funds to be raised from
the debenture offering and the proposed public offering were part of a single plan of
financing; (3) the funds received from all three offerings would be used primarily for
business operations; and (4) the debentures would be offered less than six months after
the prior private offering and less than six months before the proposed public offering.
Id. at 76,615.
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factor remains ambiguous. Neither the SEC staff nor the courts has
specified how or even whether to use any or all of this factor's various
components and neither has espoused a clear definition as to what
constitutes a single plan of financing. Consequently, issuers are
unable to identify offerings that are part of the same plan of financing
and are therefore unsure of how to structure transactions to avoid the
integration of legitimately separate offerings.8 This uncertainty also
defeats the purpose of investor protection because it creates an oppor-
tunity for issuers to manipulate the single plan of financing factor by
varying the method of distribution in slight ways to avoid the
application of this factor.82
B. The Same General Purpose Factor
Another determination to be made in considering whether multiple
securities offerings should be integrated is whether the offerings are
made for the same general purpose.83 Like the single plan of financing
factor, the weight of the same general purpose factor in the integration
analysis is unclear. Where the SEC staff has found that an issuer's
separate offerings were made for different purposes, it typically has
not recommended that the offerings be integrated. 84 Nevertheless, in
several instances where the SEC found separate offerings to have been
made for the same general purpose, it recommended against integration
because one or more of the remaining factors of the SEC's integration
test did not apply to the offerings. In each of these cases, either the
offerings were not part of a single plan of financing, were not made at
or about the same time or for the same consideration, or did not
involve the same class of securities.
Adding to the confusion in the application of the same general pur-
pose factor, the analysis of this factor often overlaps with that of the
single plan of financing factor.86 Additionally, like the single plan
factor, the analysis of the purpose factor frequently focuses on the
issuer's intent, which requires a subjective inquiry into the issuer's
8 1. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 541.
82. See id. at 531.
83. See Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 2770 (1962).
84. See, e.g., Pacific Physician Servs., 1985 WL 55629, at *3; Pittsburgh Nat'l
Corp., 1977 WL 10903, at *4.
85. See, e.g., Buxton's Country Shops, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 10847, at
*3-*4 (May 25, 1976); Eastern I11. Tel. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,238, at 85,492 (Mar. 14, 1975); Industrial
Dev. Bd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9761, at *3-*4 (Oct. 16, 1973).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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reasons for making each offering. 7 This inquiry is generally satisfied
by the issuer's representation of its motives for making the offerings,8
illustrating how easily issuers can manipulate the application of this
factor to their separated offerings.89 In other instances, however, the
SEC staff examined objective criteria rather than an issuer's represen-
tation of its motives for making the offerings to determine whether the
offerings were made for the same general purpose. For example,
where an issuer used the proceeds from separate offerings differently,
the SEC staff concluded that the offerings were made for different
purposes.9" Similarly, the SEC concluded in another no-action letter
that offerings were made for different purposes when one offering was
made for financial purposes and another for non-financial purposes. 91
87. E.g., Pacific Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,714, at 86,846 (July 13, 1976); see 3 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 35, at 1213.
88. See, e.g., Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (D. Mass.
1974). The Livens court, applying the factors cited in Securities Act Release No. 4552,
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the existence of a single plan of
financing because "each successive financing was expected by the defendants to be the
last which would be required to make [the issuer] self supporting." Id. Moreover, the
court emphasized that certain events that precipitated the need for additional financing,
some of which "were not contemplated at the time of... financing[,]" were beyond the
control of the defendants. Id.
89. See, e.g., DeLorean Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 11174 (Aug. 15,
1977). In DeLorean, the SEC staff determined that integration would not be mandated
with respect to private and public offerings of common stock made simultaneously. Id.
at *1. The staffs no-action position was based on the issuer's representation that the
purpose of the public offering was to establish a network of dealers for the issuer's prod-
uct, whereas the purpose of the private offering was to raise short-term working capital
and to establish a relationship with an investor who would promote the issuer's product.
Id.
90. Citicorp, SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,778, at 87,016 (Aug. 20, 1976). In Citicorp, the staff found that the
purpose factor did not apply to offerings where the issuer planned to use the proceeds of
one of the offerings to finance current projects and the proceeds of a second offering to
finance future transactions. Id.
9 1. Stratford Employees' Cattle Program, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,761, at 84,048 (Mar. 8, 1974). In
Stratford, the issuer sought to distinguish a proposed exempt offering to employees
from concurrent registered offerings by stating that "[tlhe actual consideration to be
received by the [corporation from its offering to employees] .. .is the continued morale
and well-being of their employees which will result from providing them with cattle
feeding investments in which the possibility of loss is minimized." Id. at 84,052-53.
The SEC staff concluded that the offerings were made for different purposes and recom-
mended that no action be taken with respect to the proposed offering. Id. at 84,049.
This no-action letter demonstrates the overlap between the factors in the SEC's test for
integration. See the discussion of the same consideration factor, infra part III.D.; see
also Deaktor, supra note 5, at 536 (noting the overlap between the same general purpose
and same consideration factors).
This letter involved a case in which the SEC staff found that offerings of common
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These objective approaches to determining whether the purpose factor
applies to separate offerings, while initially helpful, become less help-
ful when a single offering is made for more than one purpose. As a
result, one commentator has proposed that "when the proceeds from
more than twenty-five percent of the securities offered ... are to be
used for one" purpose, "the offering [should] be deemed to have been
for that purpose. 92
C. The Same Class of Securities Factor
Another factor to which the SEC staff and courts look in determin-
ing whether multiple securities offerings should be integrated is
whether the offerings involve the same class of securities.93 The cases
and no-action letters offer little guidance as to the weight to be given
the same class of securities factor in the integration analysis. At least
one issuer placed a great deal of emphasis on this factor in its letter of
inquiry to the SEC.94 The issuer argued that integration was inappro-
priate because "the availability of the 'exempt securities' exemptions
in section 3 of the Securities Act of 1933 is not dependent upon the
character of the transaction in which the securities are offered for sale
and sold, but rather upon the nature of the security itself. " 95 Although
the SEC staff determined, based upon the issuer's representations, that
the offerings should not be integrated,96 it did not specifically conclude
that the offerings involved different classes of securities. 97
Compounding the confusion associated with this factor, the SEC
and courts have failed to articulate a precise formula to determine
whether securities are of the same class.98 As a result, issuers are
stock to an issuer's employees were made for the non-financial purpose of strengthening
the employer/employee relationship, while public offerings of the same issuer's
common stock were made to raise funds, clearly involving a financial purpose. Even
though the offerings were made simultaneously, involving the same class of security for
the same consideration, the offerings were not integrated because they were made for
different purposes.
92. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 636.
93. See Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 2770 (1962).
94. See Liberty Nat'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12527, at *2 (Apr. 21,
1976); see also Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 633 (suggesting that "[tihe
nature of the securities offered is so fundamental to the integration concept that this
criterion, in and of itself, should be the basis for a safe harbor").
95. Liberty Nat'l Corp., 1976 WL 12527, at *2.
96. Id. at *4.
97. See id. at *3-*4.
98. One commentator suggests that the identities of the issuer and the offerees are the
most relevant considerations. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 531-32. His conclusion is
based on the observation that: (1) different issuers offer inherently different types of
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uncertain how to determine whether offerings involve the same class
of securities. Generally, the courts and SEC staff have found offer-
ings non-integrable where the types of securities offered are clearly
different, such as an offering of common stock and an offering of
preferred stock.99 In at least one case, the SEC staff recommended
that no action be taken to integrate offerings of commercial paper and
unsecured promissory notes.1°°
Despite the apparent emphasis on distinguishing the types of securi-
ties, offerings involving classes of securities that have not been clearly
and conclusively distinguished have been found to be non-integrable.
In fact, when two or more securities are only slightly different, the
SEC staff and courts have refrained from integrating offerings or have
found that offerings did not involve the same class of securities.'
Consequently, issuers seeking to manipulate this factor and evade the
Act's registration requirements can simply separate offerings and avoid
integration by offering securities that differ only slightly.10 2 Even
securities; and (2) offerings directed at different pools of potential investors are more
likely to be of different classes. Id.
99. E.g., Agri-Quip, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 9638, at *2-*3 (Aug. 21, 1974)
(concluding that industrial revenue bonds and common stock represent different classes
of securities); see Stevenson, supra note 77, at 53.
100. Citicorp, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,778, at
87,017. The staff found the same class of security factor inapplicable because the securi-
ties had "completely distinctive maturity dates" and one of the securities was a "short
term[,] cash equivalent investment with an emphasis on liquidity," whereas the other
securities "[would] essentially be purchased for long term investment." Id. at 87,017.
Unfortunately, in Citicorp and Agri-Quip, the extent to which the four remaining
factors contributed to the decisions not to integrate is unclear. See generally, Citicorp,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,778; Agri-Quip, 1974 WL
9638.
101. E.g., Metropolitan Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,485, at 86,259-60 (Mar. 1, 1976) (concluding that
the offerings of convertible debentures and subordinated debentures were not an inte-
grated offering); see also S.E.C. v. Dunfee, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91,970, at 96,302 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (concluding that an offering of notes
with an interest rate of 6% and a separate offering of notes with an interest rate of 7% by
the same issuer eight months later did not require integration). But see Task Force on
Integration, supra note 43, at 633-34 (criticizing narrowly drawn classes of securities
and recommending that separate offerings be considered non-integrable only if each fell
within a different class of four broad classes of securities: common stock; preferred
stock; nonsecured debt; and secured debt).
102. See Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 633-35. For instance, there is
nothing in the cases and no-action letters that prohibits an issuer of debentures from
artificially dividing its offering by making some of the debentures convertible into
another type of security. If the debenture is convertible immediately after its purchase,
then the economic reality indicates that the offerings involve two different classes of
securities because if the holder elects to convert immediately, she will hold two distinct
types of securities. If, however, the debenture is not immediately convertible, or if it is
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where the offered securities differ greatly, thereby rendering this factor
inapplicable and possibly resulting in a non-integration position,
investors might still benefit from the protection that registration
provides.0 3 This illustrates that the same class of security factor
sometimes fails to reflect the Act's goal of investor protection.
D. The Same Consideration Factor
Another factor in the SEC's formula to determine whether separate
securities offerings should be integrated is whether the securities are
offered in exchange for the same consideration. 10 4 This factor is
significant and sometimes dispositive of the integration question.'0 5
Unlike the single plan of financing and same general purpose factors,
this factor does not require a subjective inquiry into the motives of the
issuer's management. Instead, the issue of whether securities are
offered in exchange for the same consideration can be determined
objectively, making this factor potentially valuable in identifying sepa-
rated offerings that could have been issued as one transaction.'
0 6
Despite this advantage, the impact of the same consideration factor on
the integration determination is uncertain. Where the consideration
sought in exchange for two or more offerings differs, the courts and
SEC staff often conclude that the offerings should not be integrated.'0 7
Most offerings that have been found not to involve the same consid-
eration, however, generally also have been found to fail either the
single plan of financing or the same general purpose prongs of the
convertible into a substantially similar instrument, then the economic reality reflects
that the offerings of the debenture and the convertible debenture involve the same class
of security. The Task Force on Integration has proposed that convertible securities be
considered to be both the convertible security itself and the security into which it is
convertible. Id. at 634. The adoption of this proposal would avoid manipulation of this
factor, but similar manipulation could occur in other contexts. For example, an issuer
could separate an offering of common stock by deeming one offering to involve non-
voting common stock, thereby avoiding application of the same class of securities
factor.
103. See id., supra note 43, at 634-35. For example, offerings of common stock and
long-term debt clearly do not involve the same class of security. When a company is
badly in need of capital, however, there exists very little economic difference between
the long-term debt and the common stock that it issues. Id. at 633.
104. See Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 2770 (1962).
.105. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 54.
106. Deaktor, supra note 5, at 536.
107. See, e.g., UST Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 14485, at *6-*7 (Apr. 8,
1977); Remote Computing Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,182, at 82,597 (Nov. 28, 1972).
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SEC's integration test.08 This makes it quite difficult to determine the
extent to which this one particular factor will influence the outcome of
the integration question.
The same consideration factor poses an additional problem because
cash is most often the consideration sought in securities offerings.0 9
Because cash is so commonly sought as the consideration for a
security, this factor may not provide an accurate and reliable indication
that an issuer has artificially divided its offerings to avoid the Act's
registration requirements. In one letter of inquiry to the SEC, issuer's
counsel unsuccessfully argued that the applicability of the same
consideration factor should be ignored where cash is the consideration
for the offerings." 0 In another letter of inquiry, issuer's counsel
proposed that the applicability of this factor should only be considered
"where the consideration received in two purportedly separate offer-
ings involves integral parts of the same asset, such as stock of the
same corporation or assets which are useful only in combination with
one another.""' The SEC, however, declined to render an opinion on
that issuer's inquiry and left the analysis of this factor in question."
2
E. The Same Time of Offering Factor
An additional factor to which the SEC and courts look when deter-
mining whether to integrate multiple securities offerings is whether the
offerings were made at or about the same time." 3 Due to the potential
impact on investor behavior, contemporaneous offerings may warrant
108. See Stevenson, supra note 77, at 54 (noting that most offerings typically
possess all three of these factors-same consideration, single plan of financing, and
same general purpose-or none of them).
109. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 535.
110. A.G. Becker & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 11399, at *3 (Jan. 17,
1975). In A.G. Becker & Co., a bank holding company proposed two unregistered offer-
ings, both of which sought cash consideration and qualified for registration exemptions.
Id. at *1, *3. The first offering involved the issue of commercial paper pursuant to §
3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act. Id. at *1. The second offering, which was guaranteed by the
holding company, involved a § 4(2) offering of unsecured promissory notes by a sub-
sidiary of the holding company. Id. The SEC agreed not to integrate the two offerings
"provided that [the] proceeds of the [commercial paper] offerings made in reliance on
Section 3(a)(3) are not used to honor the [holding company's] guarantee of the ...
subsidiary's paper issued in reliance on section 4(2)." Id. at *4. See also Laserfax,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,136, at 76,614 (reasoning
that a similar transaction should be integrated despite arguments raised by the issuer as
to the consideration factor).
I 11. Hawkeye Bancorporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12602, at *4 (Apr.
1, 1976).
112. See id. at *7.
113. See Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 2770 (1962).
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greater scrutiny than offerings that are not proximate in time." 4 The
timing of the offerings, however, is perhaps the least significant of all
five factors." 5 To provide some certainty as to the permissible timing
of separate offerings, the SEC has created certain safe harbor rules that
deem offerings separated by at least six months to be non-
integrable.'16 Issuers for whom these safe harbors are unavailable,
however, receive little guidance from cases and no-action letters
regarding the amount of time necessary between offerings to avoid
integration." 7 The SEC staff has only indicated that it will not apply
this factor when the timing of the offerings is not interdependent or is
merely "coincidental."'1 8 Beyond these observations, however,
issuers cannot be certain as to when the SEC will consider offerings to
be contemporaneous and therefore, possibly integrable." 9 Like the
same consideration factor, whether offerings are made at the same time
is potentially helpful because it can be objectively analyzed. The
uncertainty as to the amount of time required between offerings to
remove the offerings from scrutiny under this factor, however, renders
its analysis inconsistent from case to case.
IV. ANALYSIS
Applying the SEC's integration formula has proven difficult for
issuers and for the SEC itself. From 1971, the year in which the
SEC's no-action letters first became publicly available, to 1979, the
SEC answered almost two hundred letters from issuers and their coun-
sel requesting clarification of the integration concept and an assessment
of the doctrine's applicability to their transactions. 20 In 1979, the
SEC announced that it would no longer respond to inquiries about the
integration of securities offerings.' 2' In 1985, the SEC resumed its
114. Deaktor, supra note 5, at 534.
115. E.g., Wellington Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12640, at *6
(Aug. 23, 1976) (concluding that the mere fact that a mutual fund was continuously
offered does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the continuous offering should
be "integrated" and subject to registration); see Deaktor, supra note 5, at 534.
116. See supra note 61.
117. See Stevenson, supra note 77, at 54.
118. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 534-35.
119. See Laserfax, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,136, at
76,614 (suggesting that offerings separated by less than six months risk integration).
120. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 527.
121. See Clover Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13557, at *7 (March 5,
1979). The SEC staff stated:
Because of the complexity of the proposed arrangements and the possibility
that staff positions on the integration concept may be misconstrued and
misapplied in other situations, we will not be issuing interpretations in this
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attempt to clarify the integration question and began to respond, once
again, to inquiries concerning integration. 122 The SEC, however, has
failed to articulate a clear and precise integration policy that adequately
reflects the goals of the Act and the integration doctrine. This part
examines both the SEC's current formula for integration and a
proposed analysis promulgated by the Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities and offers a critical review of each.
A. The SEC's Integration Formula
1. An Imprecise and Inconsistent Approach
When the various safe harbors from integration are unavailable,
issuers must resort to the integration analysis set forth in Securities Act
Release No. 4552 to determine whether two or more offerings should
be integrated. 123 The analysis under the integration formula has been
confusing and inconsistent, 124 and the SEC's no-action letters and the
opinions of courts have provided very little guidance with respect to
the analysis that must be performed under the five factor test. As a
result, the SEC's test for integration is imprecise, inconsistently
applied, and easily manipulated by issuers intending to evade the Act's
registration requirements. 1
25
The SEC's test is problematic because the SEC has failed to clarify
how many of the five factors must apply to separate offerings to
support the conclusion that they should be integrated. It is not neces-
sary to find that all five factors are present to conclude that integration
is warranted. 126 The exact number of affirmative answers required
before offerings are integrated, however, is unclear. Integration seems
unlikely unless four of the five factors are applicable, 127 but in some
area any longer. Rather, it is our position that counsel, with guidance of
[Securities Act] Release No. 33-4552, should make a determination as to
whether or not particular offerings should be integrated.
Id.
122. See 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 403 (Mar. 8, 1985).
123. See supra part II.B.
124. Frame, supra note 55, at 864.
125. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 541-42; Task Force on Integration, supra note 43,
at 596; Frame, supra note 55, at 864-65.
126. E.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1980); see 3 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 1222 & n.21; Frame, supra note 55, at 870; see also
Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 1
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2272, at 2608 (Dec. 6, 1961) (commenting that "any one of
the [five] factors may be determinative of the question of integration").
127. See, e.g., LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,136, at 76,615 (Aug. 15, 1985) (recommending that offer-
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cases, the satisfaction of only one of the factors has led to integra-
tion. 28 Beyond these modest observations, however, issuers can only
attempt to avoid integration by looking to ambiguous guidelines that
are applied on a case-by-case basis. 29
Besides the difficulty in determining the number of factors neces-
sary to require integration, the no-action letters and opinions reveal
very little about how the factors are interrelated, and there is no clear
articulation as to the priority or weight to be given each factor. 30 The
SEC's no-action letters support only the general observation that the
SEC apparently considers the single plan of financing and the same
general purpose factors to be important.' 3' The plan and purpose
factors are discussed more often and in greater detail than the remain-
ing factors in the cases and no-action letters. When offerings are not
made as part of a single plan or made for the same general purpose, the
courts and SEC staff often take a non-integration position. 3 2 The
weight of the remaining three factors, however, is entirely unclear.
Offerings are often integrated even though they involve different
classes of securities, are not made for the same consideration, or are
not proximate in time.'33 Neither the cases nor the no-action letters has
expressly assigned the weight to be given these three factors.
In addition to the problems involved in determining the weight of
the five factors both individually and in the aggregate, the factors
under the SEC's current integration analysis lack clear and consistent
definitions. For instance, it is not clear when offerings will be
ings be integrated based on the presence of at least four of the five factors).
128. See, e.g., Charles E. Watters, SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13303, at *4
(Apr. 24, 1978) (concluding that two offerings should be integrated solely because of
the presence of a single plan of financing).
129. Determining the SEC's probable course of action solely from cases and no-
action letters poses a substantial challenge to issuers and their counsel, for the cases and
letters typically find that all of the factors are present, see Sonnenblick, Parker &
Selvers, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66490, at *3 (Jan. 1, 1986), or only implic-
itly refer to one or two factors, see Philip Churchill & Earl Hoskins, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1978 WL 12047, at *5-*6 (Sept. 25, 1978). Even more daunting for issuers and
their counsel is the observation by one commentator that the SEC staff commonly
ignores the five factors and examines other relevant factors not listed in Securities Act
Release No. 4552. See Stevenson, supra note 77, at 50.
130. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 50; Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at
596; see also Deaktor, supra note 5, at 503 (noting that Securities Act Release No. 4552
simply refers to all five factors as relevant considerations).
131. Sonnenblick, Parker & Selvers, 1986 WL 66490, at *3.
132. See, e.g., Immune Response Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108556, at
*4-*5 (Oct. 2, 1987); Royal LePage Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66905, at *4
(May 16, 1986); Pacific Physician Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55629,
at *2 (July 22, 1985).
133. See supra part III.C-E.
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integrated because they involve a single plan of financing or are made
for the same general purpose. 134 Also, the SEC has yet to determine
the temporal boundaries defining contemporaneous offerings."' Even
the inquiry as to whether offerings involve the same class of security,
which ostensibly can be objectively determined, is difficult because the
absence of clear boundaries between classes of securities leaves too
much room for interpretation.
36
A case decided in December 1992 illustrates the nebulous character
of the SEC's five factor test and the failure of the courts to clarify the
factors' definitions. In Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating &
Production Corp.,13 7 Judge Cudahy of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit described the case as involving "a
familiar tale of an oil-drilling project come to grief."'' 38 To raise funds
for its oil drilling project, the defendant, a small corporation with four
shareholders, sold interests in a limited partnership, COPCO- 1, to
some investors. 139 The defendant issuer retained a broker to sell the
limited partnership units in April 1983."4 Later in the year, the issuer
offered additional units in two newly formed limited partnerships,
COPCO-2 in October, and COPCO-3 in November, to be sold by the
same broker.' Each limited partnership, however, was to drill sepa-
rate wells.'42 Upon discovering that the wells would produce no oil,
several investors filed suit claiming that the defendant issuer violated
section 5 of the 1933 Act by selling the unregistered limited
partnership units. 143
In issuing the securities without first registering them with the SEC,
the issuer in Donohoe relied upon Rule 505, promulgated by the SEC
134. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
135. See supra part III.E.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
137. 982 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1992).
138. Id. at 1132.
139. Id. at 1133. The corporation was the sole general partner in COPCO-1. Id.
140. Id.
141. Donohoe, 982 F.2d at 1134.
142. Id. After the corporate issuer sold interests in the first three limited partner-
ships, interests were sold in a fourth limited partnership, COPCO-4. Id. The offering of
interests in COPCO-4 was made by a different issuer since the general partner of COPCO-
4 was an individual and not the corporate general partner of the first three partnerships.
Donohoe, 982 F.2d at 1134. Even though the individual general partner of COPCO-4
was also a shareholder of the corporate general partner of COPCO-1, 2 and 3, the court
held that issuer integration was not warranted. Id. at 1140.
143. Donohoe, 982 F.2d at 1135. The wells were capped because some produced
excessive amounts of water, while others "developed 'gas lock'." Id. at 1134. The court
described "gas lock," a term that the parties failed to define, as something "which ap-
pears to be good news if you want gas and bad news if you want oil." Id.
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under the 1933 Act, which exempts from registration offers and sales
of securities that do not exceed $5,000,000.'44 In analyzing whether
the offerings should have been registered, the court first noted that if
the offerings could be considered four separate offerings, the issuer's
reliance upon Rule 505 was legitimate.145 The court then considered
whether the four offerings should be integrated into a single offering
for the purpose of determining whether the securities should have been
registered.
46
Weighing in favor of integration were two factors; the issuer had
received the same consideration for the four offerings, and each offer-
ing involved the same class of securities. 47 Noting that the same time
factor did not weigh either for or against integration,148 the court con-
sidered whether the offerings were part of a single plan of financing
and whether they had been made for the same general purpose.149
Without expressly stating how it reached its conclusion, the court
found that the offerings were not part of a single plan of financing. 50
The only guidance that the court offered in analyzing the single plan of
financing factor was "that each drilling project was designed to stand
or fall on its own merits.' 5' Unfortunately, the court offered even
less guidance with respect to the analysis of the remaining factor,
whether the offerings were made for the same general purpose.
Demonstrating the confusion that exists in analyzing the same general
purpose factor, yet declining to clear up that confusion, Judge Cudahy
noted that the district court considered the purposes of the offerings to
be different because the partnerships did not share profits and
losses.5 2 The Seventh Circuit cast some doubt upon the district
court's analysis of the purposes of the offerings. Nevertheless, it
adopted the district court's holding:
We are not sure that the district court's construction of the
[purpose] factor is necessarily correct. The term 'same general
144. SEC Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1993).
145. Donohoe, 982 F.2d at 1140.
146. Id. The issuer conceded that if the offerings were integrated into one offering,
that offering would fail to qualify for an exemption under Rule 505, and the issuer would
have issued the securities in violation of § 5 of the 1933 Act. Id.
147. Id.
148. Donohoe, 982 F.2d at 1140. Foregoing the opportunity to clarify when offer-
ings are made at or about the same time, Judge Cudahy found the timing of the offerings
to be "fairly neutral." Id. Six months separated the first and second offerings, and the
second and third offerings were separated by one month. Id. at 1133-34.
149. Id. at 1140.
150. Donohoe, 982 F.2d at 1140.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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purpose' suggests a level of generality to the integration analysis
that may be satisfied by the observation that the purpose of each
partnership was to drill for oil. But without expressing a definite
opinion on that subject, we nonetheless affirm the court's
holding. 15
3
Although the Seventh Circuit had an opportunity to clarify the applica-
tion of the factors in the SEC's integration formula, the Donohoe
opinion, like many other court opinions and SEC no-action letters,
failed to provide a meaningful analysis of those factors.
The court opinions and SEC no-action letters that employ a subjec-
tive inquiry into the state of mind of the issuer's management illustrate
the imprecision and ambiguity that surround the SEC's five-factor
integration formula.' 54 The lack of objective criteria with which to
determine whether integration is appropriate leaves too much room for
subjective interpretation, increasing the possibility of confusion and,
worse, manipulation of the integration doctrine by issuers attempting
to evade the Act's registration requirements. For example, one newly
formed company planned an unregistered offering that was exempt
from registration pursuant to SEC Rule 504,' to be followed within a
period of six months by a registered public offering.'56 In seeking the
staffs interpretive advice regarding the applicability of the integration
principle to these transactions, issuer's counsel argued that the compo-
nents of the SEC's integration formula did not apply to its offerings.'57
First, the issuer's counsel claimed that the offerings were made for
different purposes, contending that the proceeds from the unregistered
offering would go toward the company's start-up costs and financing
the subsequent public offering, while the funds raised in the public
offering would be used to commence business operations. 118 In an
assertion that illustrates the willingness of some issuers to advance a
manipulative interpretation of the factors to avoid integration, issuer's
counsel suggested that the offerings involved different classes of
securities because the common stock offered under Rule 504 would be
unregistered, and the common stock offered to the public would be
registered. 9 Counsel further asserted that different consideration
153. Id. (citation omitted).
154. See supra notes 75-77, 87-89 and accompanying text.
155. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1993).
156. Sonnenblick, Parker & Selvers, 1986 WL 66490, at *1.
157. Id. at *2.
158. Sonnenblick, Parker & Selvers, 1986 WL 66490, at *2. Counsel also used its
characterization of the offerings' purposes to argue that the offerings were parts of
different plans of financing. Id.
159. Id.
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would be given for the two offerings because the price of the
registered securities would be substantially higher than the price of the
unregistered securities. 160
The SEC staff concluded that the Sonnenblick issuer was planning
to splinter a single transaction and that the offerings would be inte-
grated so that the Rule 504 offering would be part of the registered
offering. 161 In its reply, the staff stated that it was unable to discern a
difference in the purposes of the two offerings. 6 2 The staff also
determined that the offerings constituted a single plan of financing
because "the issuer anticipates the need for the capital from both offer-
ings in order to go forward with its operations."'' 63 Finally, the staff
concluded that the offerings involved the same class of security
(common stock), were made for the same consideration (cash), and
were made at or about the same time.164
The position taken by the Sonnenblick issuer demonstrates at least
two problems that have arisen from the imprecision and uncertainty of
the SEC's current integration formula. First, a prospective issuer does
not know with certainty whether the integration principle will apply to
its securities transactions. 16' The confusing interpretations of the five
factors and the lack of clear guidance with respect to the priority or
weight of each factor increase the issuer's uncertainty in structuring
offerings. This uncertainty seriously impedes capital formation.
166
Second, as the courts and SEC staff develop subjective criteria in
160. Id.
161. Sonnenblick, Parker & Selvers, 1986 WL 66490, at *3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Frame, supra note 55, at 866.
166. Reconsideration of the integration formula would be an important step toward
achieving the SEC's goal of facilitating capital formation, especially for the small
issuer. Indeed, the uncertainty of the current integration formula may impact small com-
panies the greatest. Small issuers, often unable to afford the expense of retaining
counsel to determine whether the SEC's test applies to their transactions, may be the
least able to delay the raising of needed funds. Emphasizing the importance of small
businesses in our economy and the need to ease the burden on small companies attempt-
ing to raise funds, one commentator wrote:
In discussing the background to the ... [small business initiatives], the SEC
noted that small businesses, being the cornerstone of the U.S. economy,
employ more than one-half of the domestic labor force, produce nearly half the
gross domestic product, and created the vast preponderance of new jobs during
the period 1988-1990. A critical factor in the viability of these small
businesses, which are frequently in the vanguard of developing new
technology, patents, products, and services, is access to capital.
Janvey, supra note 39, at 15 (citations omitted).
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applying the five factor test, issuers are able to manipulate the poorly
defined factors and avoid integration and registration of the offerings.
This manipulation ultimately frustrates the policy of protecting
investors through disclosure.
2. The Formula's Failure to Reflect the Goals of
the 1933 Act and the Integration Doctrine
Although the SEC's current integration formula indirectly addresses
one of the 1933 Act's fundamental policies, that investors need to be
protected through disclosure, it does little to facilitate capital
formation. 67 Because the current test for integration was formulated
at a time when investor protection through registration was the
predominant policy of the Act, it places undue emphasis on disclosure
through registration. 168 During the past 50 years, however, many
changes in the statutes and rules regulating securities offerings have
augmented investor protection in a number of ways. Many of the
current substantive protections that the exemptions provide for
investors appeared after the integration formula was first articulated by
the SEC. 169  As a result, the registration process has become a less
important component of the overall scheme to protect investors, dimin-
ishing the necessity of an interpretive policy favoring registration.
Accordingly, the SEC's current integration formula should be revised
to reflect not only the Act's disclosure policy but also the emerging
importance of the Act's policy to assist in capital formation where
disclosure through registration would be unduly burdensome. 70
The SEC has obviously concluded that the benefits of mandatory
disclosure are significant. The continued application of the integration
167. See supra part 1I for a discussion of these competing policies.
168. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 612.
169. Id. at 598-99; see also supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text discussing the
substantive protections provided in the SEC's rules regarding exemptions.
170. The response of the SEC staff in a recent no-action letter illustrates the staffs
growing recognition that, at times, offerees are sufficiently protected by exemption
requirements. In Black Box Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286633 (June 26,
1990) [hereinafter the "Black Box letter"], the SEC staff advised the issuer that no action
would be taken on an unregistered offering to qualified institutional investors for
"policy reasons." Id. at *16. The staff failed to elaborate on those policy reasons, but
relied on the representations of the issuer's counsel that the offerees of the particular
securities could fend for themselves. Id. at *16; see also Black Box Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1992 WL 55818, at *2 (Feb. 28, 1992) (noting that the staffs position in the
Black Box letter "was a policy position taken primarily in consideration of the nature
and number of offerees"). In presenting the argument against integration, the Black Box
letter emphasized the SEC's underlying policy in the enactment of Rule 144A to
consummate securities transactions quickly and efficiently and to avoid the expense of
registration when it is not needed. Black Box Inc., 1990 WL 286633, at *14.
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doctrine embodies that conclusion because the integration doctrine
ensures disclosure where issuers attempt to avoid the Act's registration
requirements. 17  A serious shortcoming of the current integration
formula, however, is that the SEC might apply the doctrine to integrate
separate offerings without considering whether the offerees need the
protection of registration. If offerees are sufficiently protected under
the exemption upon which an issuer relies in making the unregistered
offering, the issuer's ability to raise funds may be needlessly
hampered when offerings are integrated without considering whether
investors will in fact benefit from registration.
Several of the five factors of the SEC's current integration formula
do not reflect either the need for disclosure through registration or the
goal of facilitating capital formation. For instance, there is no greater
need for disclosure where offerings are part of the same plan of financ-
ing as compared to different plans of financing.7 2 The mere fact that
several offerings are part of an issuer's financial plans does not
warrant the conclusion that the offerees will not receive sufficient
protection under the exemptions upon which the issuer relied. 173
Separate offerings made for the same general purpose or the same
consideration do not indicate that disclosure through registration is
needed any more than offerings made for different purposes or differ-
ent consideration. 174 Where these factors apply to two or more offer-
ings and the offerees are nevertheless sufficiently protected by an
exemption upon which the issuer has relied, integration of the
offerings unnecessarily impedes capital formation by requiring
integration even though investors do not need the protection afforded
by registration. "5
The SEC's current integration formula also fails to distinguish
between offerings that have been artificially separated to evade the
1 71. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
172. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 51.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48 discussing the substantive protec-
tions that exemptions provide for investors.
174. In contrast, the fact that offerings are made contemporaneously or involve the
same class of security may bear some relationship to the need for disclosure through
registration under the Act. One commentator suggests that offerings made at or about
the same time have a greater impact on investors than offerings that are not contempo-
raneous. Deaktor, supra note 5, at 534. Arguably, the larger the number of offerees and
the more securities offered and sold, the greater the impact will be on the market, thereby
warranting enhanced disclosure. See id.
175. Requests for no-action letters often contain opinions by inquiring counsel that
integration is not necessary to protect investors. See, e.g., Hawkeye Bancorporation,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12602, at *6 (Apr. 1, 1976); Safeguard Mini-Storage,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 11055, at *3 (Jul. 29, 1974).
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registration process and offerings that are legitimately separate. A
fundamental aim of the integration doctrine is to combine offerings that
have been artificially separated in an attempt to evade the Act's
registration requirements.'76 Offerings should be integrated only when
issuers have abused the Act's exemptions by splintering their offerings
to take advantage of exemptions that would otherwise not have been
available for a single offering. Under the current integration formula,
however, offerings that are separated for legitimate business reasons
may be combined because the inquiry made under the five factor test
does not involve an evaluation of the issuer's need to make separate
offerings.
None of the five factors in the SEC's integration formula is directly
relevant to the question of whether an issuer divided its securities
offerings to take advantage of exemptions that otherwise would not
have been available. For example, the fact that offerings are part of the
same plan of financing or are made for the same purpose does not
necessarily indicate that the offerings were made separately to avoid
registration. Similarly, an issuer that has made two or more offerings
contemporaneously, for the same consideration, or involving the same
class of security has not necessarily divided the offerings to use
otherwise unavailable exemptions. The test in no way indicates
whether an issuer has misused the Act's exemptions. Even where all
five factors apply, an issuer may have made separate offerings for
reasons that do not involve an attempt to evade the Act's registration
requirements. When an issuer has not abused the Act's exemptions,
but the application of the SEC's integration formula nevertheless
results in the combination of separate offerings, the integration
doctrine hampers the issuer's ability to raise capital even though there
may be no corresponding benefit to potential investors.
In essence, the SEC's current integration formula merely indicates
that the issuer could have structured the offerings as one transaction.
The factors enable the SEC to "look behind ostensibly separate issues
or transactions to see if, in economic reality, they are really a single
issue."'77 The sole fact that the factors apply to two or more offerings,
however, should not determine the integration question; rather, such a
determination should only be used to identify offerings that could have
been made as one offering in economic terms. Once this identification
has been made, the transactions should be further analyzed before
offerings are integrated, keeping in mind the Act's competing policies
176. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
177. Weiss, Peck, and Greer Venture Assocs. II, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL
286380, at *8 (Apr. 10, 1990).
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and the fundamental goal of integration. 7 8 In sum, the SEC's test for
integration must work so legitimately separate offerings will not be
combined.
B. The Proposal of the Task Force on Integration
The profound changes in the area of securities regulation' 79
prompted the American Bar Association's Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities to create a Task Force on Integration (the
"Task Force"), which was instructed "to examine the entire integration
area and to make proposals that would help the Commission and the
securities bar to answer questions of integration."' 80 The Task Force
set out to articulate an analytical formula for determining when securi-
ties offerings should be integrated. The Task Force abandoned this
goal, however, and instead proposed a series of safe harbor protec-
tions from integration.' 8' These safe harbor provisions are useful, and
they should be adopted. The safe harbor provisions alone, however,
will not sufficiently resolve the integration problem. Issuers for whom
no safe harbors from integration are available would still be forced to
resort to the SEC's five factor integration formula. 82
Recognizing that the SEC's current integration formula does not
promote both of the countervailing policies of the 1933 Act, the Task
Force sought to resolve some of the problems that frequently arise
under the current regime. For example, the Task Force noted that "the
[integration] concept could cause numerous sales to be integrated (and
thereby registered) when their registration would not significantly
enhance investor protection and could seriously impair the issuer's
capital formation and operating plans."' 83 The Task Force also recog-
nized that many of the exemptions upon which issuers rely "have their
own means for ensuring investor protection," rendering integration
and registration of the offerings unnecessary. 84 The Task Force,
attempting to resolve some of the problems that it addressed, sought to
articulate objective criteria to determine whether offerings should be
integrated. The Task Force proposed six safe harbors from integra-
tion: (1) an issuer safe harbor; (2) a temporal safe harbor; (3) a
178. See infra part V.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
180. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 596.
181. Id. at 596-97.
182. Safe harbors provide limited relief to the integration dilemma, for the provi-
sions fail to address many transactions. See supra note 61.
183. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 596.
184. Id.
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securities safe harbor; (4) a purpose safe harbor; (5) a policy safe
harbor; and (6) a foreign offering safe harbor. 8 5
The Task Force's temporal safe harbor guarantees that offerings
separated by periods of six months or greater will not be integrated.
8 6
Under this proposal, the timing of the offerings would be the sole
consideration in determining whether the offerings are integrable. The
Task Force also proposed a safe harbor under which offerings made
for different purposes would not be integrated. The Task Force
enumerated four specific purposes for which offerings could be made
in reliance upon this safe harbor: raising working capital; eliminating
specific indebtedness through an exchange offering; fostering relations
with employees and officers; and acquiring specific properties or
businesses.' 87 Under the Task Force's proposal, two or more
offerings that are made for different purposes among the four articu-
lated will not be integrated. 8 Adoption of this safe harbor would
solve several problems. First, it would eliminate the need to determine
the weight of the same general purpose factor because the sole inquiry
would be whether the purposes of the offerings differ. Second, the
bright-line distinctions between the four categories of purposes would
eliminate the inconsistent analyses of the same general purpose factor
and the confusing overlap between it and the single plan of financing
185. Id. at 624. The safe harbors pertaining to issuer integration and the integration
of domestic and foreign offerings are beyond the scope of this Article. Problems of
issuer integration, which involve a determination that two business enterprises should
be deemed a single issuer, are primarily found in the context of franchising or licensing
arrangements and arise less frequently than problems of offering or venture integration.
Also, the SEC has already provided significant guidance on the integration of foreign
offerings with offerings made by the same issuer in the United States. The Task Force
commented that:
Although the [1933] Act appears on its face to apply to offerings made by
U.S. issuers outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the
Commission has taken the position that "the registration requirements of
section 5 of the Act are primarily intended to protect the American investors."
Accordingly, the Commission has not taken any action for failure to register
securities of U.S. corporations distributed abroad to foreign nationals, even
though use through jurisdictional means may be involved in the offering.
Id. at 639 (footnotes omitted). This Article only analyzes the Task Force's temporal,
purpose, and securities safe harbor provisions.
186. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 632-33. The Task Force's temporal
safe harbor reflects the SEC's safe harbor provision embodied in SEC Rule 502, which
protects Regulation D offerings made six months apart from integration. See supra note
61 discussing the SEC's safe harbor provisions. The Task Force acknowledged that the
six-month period is arbitrary but found no compelling reason to select a different time
period. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 633.
187. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 635.
188. Id.
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factor in the SEC's current integration approach. Third, the Task
Force's analysis would make possible an objective inquiry into
whether the offerings were made for the same purpose. Because an
objective determination does not depend upon the issuer's representa-
tion of its motives for making the offerings, there would be little room
for an issuer to evade registration by manipulating its analysis of this
factor.
- The Task Force proposed a third safe harbor based on the type of
securities offered, which would protect offerings involving different
classes of securities from integration. 89 The Task Force proposed that
four non-integrable classifications of securities be recognized:
common stock; preferred stock; non-secured debt; and secured debt.' 90
Issuers offering two or more securities that fall into separate categories
among these four can take advantage of this safe harbor provision.
Because the Task Force clearly defined the classes of securities, its
security safe harbor alleviates much of the uncertainty encountered
when analyzing the same class of security factor under the current
integration test and reduces the ability of issuers to manipulate the
same class of security factor to avoid integration by offering securities
that vary in minor ways.' 9
The Task Force also proposed three policy safe harbors for offer-
ings made in reliance on the exemptions from registration contained in
sections 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10) of the 1933 Act. 192 Under section
3(a)(9), securities "exchanged by the issuer with its existing security
holders" are exempt from registration if no remuneration is given for
soliciting the exchange. 93 Section 3(a)(10) exempts securities issued
in an exchange offering where "the terms and conditions of such
issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness
of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is pro-
posed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to
appear" by any governmental authority authorized to grant such
approval. 94 Adoption of these policy safe harbors would mean that
reliance on the exemptions granted under sections 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10)
would not be undermined by the integration doctrine.
189. Id. at 633.
190. Id. at 633-34.
191. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
192. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 636.
193. 1933 Act § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988). In essence, the offerees in a §
3(a)(9) transaction are deemed to be sufficiently familiar with the issuer and therefore do
not require the disclosure that registration provides.
194. 1933 Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1988).
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The Task Force also recommended a third policy safe harbor
precluding the integration of any exempt offering with any registered
offering. 95 The Task Force reasoned that offerees of "otherwise
exempt offerings are no worse off... than if the public offering had
not taken place" and concluded that "an exempt offering made in close
proximity to a public offering does not in any way diminish the pro-
tections afforded investors in the public offering."'96 These proposed
policy safe harbors from integration reflect the Task Force's
recognition that in at least three contexts, investor protection through
registration is not necessary. 1
97
Overall, the Task Force's proposed safe harbors appear to be
helpful. When available, these safe harbors would allow prospective
issuers to structure their transactions free from the uncertainties of the
SEC's current integration formula. Under the safe harbor proposals,
issuers would not be forced to discern the meaning of the poorly
defined components of the current test. Nor would this approach
require issuers to attempt to determine the number of factors needed to
warrant integration or the weight that will be given to each factor. The
proposed safe harbors would enable many prospective issuers to
structure their transactions with certainty, thereby avoiding the expense
and delay that issuers now incur in attempting to decipher the SEC's
integration formula.
These safe harbor proposals, however, fail to resolve many of the
problems associated with the SEC's integration policy. 98 The Task
Force was unable to formulate a series of objective tests both compre-
hensive and flexible enough to govern the great variety of complex
transactions that can be structured, and, as a result, the proposed safe
harbors may not apply to many legitimately separated offerings. For
195. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 638.
196. Id. The Task Force did note, however, that if an issuer failed to disclose to offer-
ees of a registered public offering the issuer's plans for a subsequent exempt offering, the
purchasers of the public offering may be able to seek relief under the Act's anti-fraud
provisions. Id.; see supra note 11.
197. Many members of the Task Force supported additional policy safe harbors
because they believed that there are other contexts in which statutory exemptions
adequately protect offerees, making the applicability of the integration principle and
resulting registration an unnecessary obstacle to capital formation. See Task Force on
Integration, supra note 43, at 638 (noting that the exemptions available pursuant to
SEC Rules 505 and 506 provide substantive protection for investors adequate to justify
additional safe harbor provisions). Additional policy safe harbors, however, were not
proposed due to the Task Force's fears that the proposals were too "controversial" and of
"minimal importance." Id.
198. Indeed, the Task Force concedes that these safe harbor proposals provide only a
"partial" solution to the integration problem. Id. at 641.
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example, because the proposed securities safe harbor provides an
arbitrary and broad categorization of types of securities, this safe
harbor might not apply to offerings involving "differences among
classes of securities that support, in a principled way, non-integration
treatment."' 99 If no other safe harbor were available, issuers that
offered the same type of security in legitimately separate offerings
could not rely on the proposed safe harbor, but would instead need to
resort to the SEC's problematic integration formula to determine
whether the offerings were integrable. 2' The same result would occur
where an issuer offered securities belonging to types other than the
four enumerated categories.
Similarly, the proposed purpose and temporal safe harbors would
be unavailable to many issuers. For instance, the Task Force recog-
nized three general purposes for securities offerings, one of which is
"to raise funds for general purposes."20' The Task Force noted,
however, that a majority of a company's offerings could fall into this
category. 2  Consequently, the issuers of those offerings must resort
to the SEC's five factor integration formula to determine whether its
offerings are integrable if no other safe harbor is available. Likewise,
the temporal safe harbor only protects issuers that separate their offer-
ings by a six month period.2 3 Because many issuers must frequently
and unexpectedly raise capital more than once within a six month
period, however, the temporal safe harbor would not be available to
them. This circumstance would force such issuers to analyze their
transactions under the SEC's current integration formula, which is
plagued with uncertainty and inconsistency.2 4 As a consequence,
these issuers would face the possibility of having their offerings
integrated even though registration is not needed to protect investors
and only serves to impede capital formation.
Like the SEC's current test for integration, analysis under the Task
Force's proposed safe harbors involves neither a consideration of the
need for investor protection nor an assessment of whether offerings
have been splintered to avoid the Act's disclosure requirements. The
proposed securities safe harbor fails to consider the policies behind the
disclosure requirement in its integration analysis. In support of the
199. Id. at 634-35.
200. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 635.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 632-33.
204. The Task Force refrained from commenting on or attempting to clarify the SEC's
five factor test.
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securities safe harbor, the Task Force stated that "[t]he nature of the
securities offered is so fundamental to the integration concept that this
criterion, in and of itself, should be the basis for a safe harbor.
'20 5
Yet, a fundamental principle embodied in the integration doctrine is
that offerings that have been artificially separated to evade the Act's
registration requirements should be combined in the interest of fulfill-
ing the Act's purpose of investor protection. °6 Under the Task
Force's safe harbors, an issuer's offerings might be integrated even
though the issuer did not divide the offerings to avoid the costs of
registration. The Task Force's consideration of the nature of the
classes of securities offered is therefore insufficient because it can only
assist the SEC and the courts in identifying whether offerings could
have been combined as a single issue. In contrast, a more appropriate
test would determine whether separate offerings should be integrated.
Such a test would more appropriately consider the Act's goals of
investor protection and facilitating commerce and would turn on
whether the issuer deliberately splintered an offering in an attempt to
evade the Act's registration requirements.
V. PROPOSAL
The difficulty of the integration question must not preclude an ar-
ticulation of a comprehensive formula for determining when offerings
should be integrated. In response to an extremely unstable economy
and incidents of fraud perpetrated against the investing public,
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 in an attempt to restore in-
vestor confidence by requiring that issuers of securities disclose
information relating to their business and their offerings. 20 7 Once
again, a troubled economy calls for action in securities regulation.
Investors must be protected from manipulation of the SEC's integra-
tion formula by issuers seeking to evade the Act's registration
requirements. 2 8 At the same time, issuers, especially the smaller
issuers that must raise capital frequently and in the most cost-efficient
manner, must be able to determine with certainty whether their securi-
ties offerings must be registered. Formulating a clear test to determine
whether offerings are to be integrated, a test that cannot be manipulated
by issuers and that addresses the policies of the Act and the underlying
policy of the integration doctrine itself, is a difficult task.
205. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 633.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
207. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 9, at 330.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56, 87-89, 125.
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In this Article, I propose a less easily manipulated and better defined
integration analysis to replace the SEC's current integration formula.
The proposed analysis (the "Proposal") would establish a two-part
inquiry to determine whether offerings warrant integration. This anal-
ysis is flexible enough to accommodate a great variety of transactions
and would not be as susceptible to manipulation by issuers attempting
to avoid the Act's registration requirements.
A. Step One: Consideration of the Task Force's Safe Harbors
As an initial step, the SEC should adopt all the safe harbors
proposed by the Task Force to alleviate the considerable confusion and
uncertainty created under the current integration analysis. In addition,
the SEC should adopt a safe harbor for issuers that make separate
offerings that do not involve the same type of consideration. Four
types of consideration can be enumerated: cash, services, securities,
and assets. The fact that different consideration is given for two or
more offerings, such as cash for one offering and services for a
another offering, generally indicates that the offerings have not been
artificially divided to avoid registration. Where an issuer makes sepa-
rate offerings for different consideration, there is typically a legitimate
business reason for not structuring the offerings as one transaction. 9
When offerings raise different types of consideration, structuring the
transactions as a single offering may cause undue complication and
confusion.
Adopting these safe harbors under the first step of this Proposal will
form the basis of an analysis that provides clarity and certainty for
issuers. The availability of any one of these safe harbors can be
objectively determined by either an issuer, the SEC, or the courts,
thereby eliminating the need to perform a subjective inquiry into an
issuer's intent. Although it may be possible to manipulate such objec-
tive criteria, the broad categories defining different purposes,
consideration, and classes of securities under the safe harbor provi-
sions will make it difficult for issuers to engage in the type of
manipulative abuses that are possible under the narrow and ill-defined
categories articulated under the current test.2 °
209. This intuitive assertion is derived from the observation that cash is ordinarily
the consideration for most offerings. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
Where cash is not the chosen consideration, the issuer may very well have a rational
business reason for requiring the other type of consideration, thereby making separate
offerings a more practical alternative.
210. Even though this Proposal does not consider the SEC's five factor test in deter-
mining whether offerings warrant integration, the analysis under the Proposal's safe
harbors parallels the SEC's current integration formula in considering the timing and
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Still, there are several deficiencies in the Task Force's proposal that
make these safe harbors insufficient, on their own, to serve as the sole
criteria on which to base the integration determination. First, these
safe harbors fail to consider whether the offerees actually need the
protection that registration affords and the extent to which integration
will unnecessarily hamper an issuer's ability to raise funds.2 1'
Moreover, these safe harbors do not assess whether offerings have in
fact been artificially separated to avoid registration.212 Third, the Task
Force itself acknowledged that the categories that it created to group,
for example, types of securities or the timing of protected offerings
within the safe harbors involved arbitrary line drawing that could not
be justified in light of the purposes of the 1933 Act.213 For instance,
regarding the temporal safe harbor, one might ask why the offerees of
offerings made seven months apart would be in less need of protection
through registration than the offerees of offerings made six months
apart, and whether this safe harbor could accomplish anything other
than making it more difficult for issuers to raise money.
The safe harbors should not be the sole consideration in determining
whether offerings warrant integration. Accordingly, the unavailability
of any of the proposed safe harbors to a particular issuer should not
alone lead to integration, but rather, it should only serve to identify
offerings that could have been made as a single issue. 2"4 For example,
contemporaneous offerings made for the same purpose and considera-
tion and that involve the same class of security are offerings that could
have been made as one transaction. Such offerings, however, are not
purpose of multiple offerings, the consideration given for the offerings, and the class of
security offered. This Proposal and its preliminary step of examining various safe
harbors would not, however, consider whether the offerings are part of a single plan of
financing. Requiring integration because offerings form part of a single plan of financ-
ing penalizes issuers that plan ahead and unnecessarily hampers the raising of capital.
Furthermore, there seems to be no objective method of determining whether offerings
are part of a single plan of financing. The single plan of financing factor, which has not
been clearly defined by the SEC, may require a determination of the issuer's intent to
make a series of offerings at the time the first offering is made. Moreover, the analysis
of this factor under the current test, which requires a determination of whether the offer-
ings have been coordinated as to amount and timing or whether the offerings are
independent, is too nebulous to be helpful. See supra part III.A. Discarding this factor
eliminates some of the subjective ambiguity of the SEC's test as it now exists.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 201-06.
212. Seesupraid.
213. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 633-35.
214. See Deaktor, supra note 5, at 541. Professor Deaktor suggested that the SEC's
integration formula should be employed as a "sorting mechanism" to determine which
offerings warrant scrutiny. Id. However, Professor Deaktor did not clarify how to
resolve the integration issue once potentially artificially divided offerings had been
identified.
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necessarily transactions that an issuer has splintered to avoid
registration. The unavailability of any of the proposed safe harbors
should therefore only be used as a first step to inquire whether the
transactions merit further scrutiny for integration. 2,
5
B. Step Two: Consideration of a Rational Business Reason
The second step of this Proposal requires a balancing of the 1933
Act's goal of protecting investors through registration with the
countervailing goal of fostering capital formation. When an issuer
satisfies the requirements of an exemption, the Act's goal of investor
protection is deemed to be satisfied. In this situation, it is the policy of
the Act to give more weight to the goal of facilitating commerce, and
thus registration is not required. Accordingly, under the Proposal,
offerings would not be integrated when registration would impede
capital formation and the investor protection that registration affords
has already been deemed unnecessary, unless of course, it is deter-
mined that the sole reason for splintering an offering into separate
transactions was to avoid registration. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider not only whether an issuer has satisfied the requirements of
any of the safe harbors, but also whether the issuer has frustrated the
Act's goals of investor protection and the facilitation of commerce by
seeking to thwart the purposes behind the integration doctrine.
The purpose of the integration doctrine is to determine whether an
issuer has artificially separated a securities offering solely to evade the
1933 Act's registration requirement. If the issuer can articulate a
rational business reason for dividing its offerings, the issuer has not
artificially separated its offerings for the purpose of evading the regis-
tration requirement. Because the inquiry into whether an issuer has a
rational business reason for making separate offerings goes directly to
the heart of the integration doctrine, it is necessary under this
Proposal's second step to inquire into the issuer's reason for dividing
its offerings. Where an issuer provides a rational business reason for
the separate offerings, the purpose of the integration principle has not
been frustrated, and the offerings therefore need not be integrated. If,
however, the issuer's management cannot articulate a rational business
reason for dividing the transaction, the issuer has failed to demonstrate
that it did not separate its offerings solely to avoid registration, and the
offerings must therefore be integrated.
21 5. This examination may be made by the issuer in structuring its transactions or by
the SEC or courts in examining whether two or more offerings could have been structured
as one transaction.
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Moreover, the expression of a rational business reason satisfies the
Act's goals of investor protection and the facilitation of commerce.
Obviously, if an issuer has a rational business reason for dividing
offerings, it is likely that the issuer chose to separate the offerings
because it would help the issuer to raise money. Also, because the
articulation of a rational business purpose makes it clear that an offer-
ing has not been artificially separated, the goal of investor protection
has been satisfied. This can be explained by considering the purposes
behind the exemptions from registration. If an exemption from regis-
tration is legitimately available to an issuer, then one may safely
assume Congress has already determined that the offerees are
adequately protected and that an offering was not artificially separated.
Consequently, registration would be an unnecessary impediment to
capital formation. Where an issuer has a rational business reason for
splintering an offering, it is similarly clear that the offering was not
artificially separated and that investors do not need the protection of
registration. Thus, the expression of a rational business reason for
multiple securities offerings satisfies both of the Act's goals of
investor protection and the facilitation of capital formation.
I offer several examples of rational business reasons for making
separate securities offerings. First, to raise working capital, an issuer
might make an offering to a limited number of sophisticated investors
having access to all the information relevant to the issuer and the
offering. Shortly thereafter, the issuer might unexpectedly be forced
to make a subsequent offering to a similar group for the same purpose.
The issuer that must make several offerings to raise funds for
unforeseen financial needs in a short period of time has a rational
business reason for having structured separate transactions. Second,
an issuer that plans to use different methods of distribution 1 6 has a
rational business reason for making separate offerings. Structuring the
transaction as a single offering will in most instances be unduly
confusing. Because the issuers in these examples have rational
business reasons for making separate transactions and did not splinter
the transactions to avoid registration, integration would not be
warranted under the analysis proposed in this Article. Although the
application of the SEC's current integration formula to these examples
might yield the same result, depending on the number of factors
deemed applicable, it is also possible that the offerings would be
integrated under the SEC formula. Integration in these instances,
however, would impede capital formation where the exemptions from
216. An underwritten offering, for example, involves a different method of distribu-
tion than an offering that is not underwritten.
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registration have been properly employed.
Arguably, one could compose a non-exclusive list of business
reasons for separating transactions that are made contemporaneously
or for the same purpose, or that involve the same consideration or
class of security. Such a list would help an issuer that must make
several contemporaneous offerings to plan its offerings by determining
whether its reason for making the separate offerings comports with
one of the listed reasons. This would provide issuers with certainty
that the offerings will not be integrated. Additionally, a list of
acceptable rational business reasons would preclude issuers from
manipulating this test by fabricating business reasons for making
separate offerings. For instance, an issuer that splinters one offering
because it claims that registration would have been too expensive and
time consuming has not stated a rational business reason for separating
its transactions. Costliness in terms of time and money is a good
business reason for relying on legitimately available exemptions, but
not for separating offerings to avoid registration. The list, however,
must not arbitrarily exclude other legitimate and rational business
reasons. A non-exclusive list will retain the flexibility needed in an
integration formula.
Requiring a rational business reason for making separate offerings
will not entirely resolve the uncertainty that confronts issuers when
structuring securities transactions. Issuers that legitimately separate
transactions and have a rational business reason for doing so, how-
ever, can be assured that even where offerings involve the same class
of security, are made for the same purpose and consideration, and are
made at or about the same time, their offerings will not be automati-
cally integrated without further analysis under this Proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ability of issuers to manipulate the factors of the SEC's current
integration formula allows them to avoid the application of the integra-
tion doctrine and thereby successfully evade the Act's registration
requirements. Such practices leave investors without the protection
that the Securities Act of 1933 was intended to provide. Under the
integration analysis proposed in this Article, the benefits of disclosure
are retained when exemptions from registration are unavailable because
issuers are not able to avoid integration easily by manipulating the
factors. Not all potential manipulation to evade integration is
eliminated under this Proposal. Issuers might attempt to manipulate
the more objective components of the sorting mechanism identified in
this Proposal's first step. There is also the possibility that some
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issuers will fabricate a business reason for separating offerings. This
type of deception, however, is more easily detected than the subtle
type of manipulation that can occur under the current SEC test. Under
the second step of this Proposal, the honest issuer, the issuer that is
not deliberately attempting to evade the Act's registration requirements,
can be certain that its securities offerings will not be integrated if it has
a rational business reason for making separate offerings.
The first step of the Proposal provides some degree of certainty for
issuers that structure their securities transaction by focusing on the
objective requirements of the safe harbors from integration. The fact
that offerings were made contemporaneously, that offerings involve
the same class of security, or that offerings were made for the same
purpose or consideration will not determine the integration question,
but will instead merely identify offerings that may have been artificially
divided. Through the balancing that must be performed under the
second step, this Proposal examines whether offerings should be
integrated. Offerings would be integrated only when the issuer failed
to advance a rational business reason for separate offerings. This
process would avoid integration and subsequent registration where
integration of the offerings would only impede capital formation and
do nothing to protect investors.
Most importantly, this Proposal expressly addresses both of the
Act's countervailing policies, investor protection and the facilitation of
commerce. The integration doctrine has changed little since its
inception in 1933. Since then, many substantive protections have been
added to the Act's exemptions.2 7 Registration is not always required
for investors to be protected. Now that investors are protected by the
requirements of the exemptions themselves, securities offerings should
not be integrated when registration is unnecessary for investor
protection and when registration would only hamper the ability of
investors to raise funds.
217. Task Force on Integration, supra note 43, at 598.
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